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ABSTRACT

The document contains a paper on the values theorists' approach to moral/citizenship education and three critiques of the paper. The paper discusses the common goal of values education approaches which is to help individuals lead personally satisfying lives and become constructive members of society. Values clarification, moral development, and cognitive-decision-making theories are examined as well as the traditional models of moralizing and modeling. The author proposes a synthesis of values education objectives. Further research activities are suggested, with an emphasis on furthering knowledge of each of the separate approaches and in undertaking major integrative studies which address basic issues in the field. The final section briefly examines the general community reaction to values education. The first critique takes issue with the proposed synthesis of values education theories and with the author's slighting the social context of values education. The final critique contends that the author of the main paper assesses the state of the art in values education with optimism clouded by uncritical eclecticism. (KC)

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ED178459

THE VALUES THEORISTS' APPROACH TO MORAL/CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

MORAL/CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION CONFERENCE, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, June 4-6, 1976

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PREFACE. i

PRESENTATION

"Values Education: 1976 and Beyond" by Howard Kirschenbaum 1

CRITIQUES

"Immediate Needs in Values Education: Comments on Howard Kirschenbaum's Paper" by Rodney F. Allen. . . 33

"A Perspective on Axiological Adequacy--Some Implications for Values Education: Comments on Howard Kirschenbaum's Paper" by Milton Meux . . . 45

"The Power of Positive Prognostication in Values Education: Comments on Howard Kirschenbaum's Paper" by John R. Meyer 65

BIOGRAPHIES. 73

PREFACE

This pamphlet, one of a series of four, contains a major paper on moral education and three critiques of that paper. The paper was presented at a national Conference on Moral/Citizenship Education held in June of 1976, and the critiques were commissioned independent of the conference. Three other major presentations at that conference, and accompanying critiques, comprise the companion pamphlets to this one. Each pamphlet sets forth and illuminates one of four theoretical approaches to moral education: cognitive-decision theory, developmental theory, prosocial theory/research, and values theory. These approaches were selected because it was felt that they represent areas of research, development, and writing which have had the most significant impact on the field.

Although the series is conceived as a unit providing an overview of selected moral education perspectives, each pamphlet is intended to stand alone as representative and expository of one specific approach.

Conference Background

The conference at which the papers were presented was a highlight of a 1975-76 yearlong planning effort carried out by Research for Better Schools (RBS) under contract with the National Institute of Education (NIE). The conference brought together approximately 85 experts representing a

variety of viewpoints and interests.

The primary purpose of the conference (in addition to facilitating an exchange of information across the field) was to develop moral/citizenship education recommendations from as wide a base as possible concerning research, development, and dissemination. The key process was one of interaction, with work groups arriving at recommendations on the basis of the four major informational papers collected in this publication series, and work-group deliberations. The recommendations were then submitted to NIE and the public.

On the basis of the conference recommendations, a coordinated plan of R, D, & D for moral/citizenship education (at that time termed ethical-citizenship education) was developed which has the endorsement of a wide and influential constituency. Work is in progress to advocate and implement that plan.

In the past year Moral/Citizenship Education and Ethical-Citizenship Education have merged as a broadly conceived Citizen Education component of RBS. The front and back matter of this pamphlet summarizes aspects of that component, including objectives, affiliations, and resources.

The Values Approach to Moral Education

The major paper and critiques in this pamphlet deal with the values approach to moral education, a brief summary of

which follows. This highly condensed statement can portray only the most general characteristics of the values perspective. It is included here simply to orient the reader, not to define the field.

The theoretical position most widely accepted in the schools today is that of the values theorists, particularly one subsumed under it: values clarification. The key distinctive feature of the values theorists is their belief in the centrality of values in human action and personality. A value is defined as an enduring personal quality or belief which serves to organize personal behavior, either consciously or unconsciously. The position is further distinguished by the assumptions that individuals can become conscious of their values and can consciously direct their actions consistent with those values. The values theorists are united in their dual objective to bring values to the level of personal consciousness and to influence individuals to use their values as a guide, to act consistently with them. The values theorists do differ on whether there are good or bad values or whether it is useful and justifiable to present a delimited list of values. Several maintain that certain kinds of values, such as equality and self-welfare, should be emphasized in any educational effort. Finally, most values theorists believe that there should be harmony or

noncontradiction among values held by each individual. The values theorists include educators, psychologists, sociologists, and economists. This position is having a visible effect on educational practice today.

VALUES EDUCATION: 1976 AND BEYOND

Howard Kirschenbaum

National Humanistic Education Center

The author suggests that many different values-education approaches share 2 common goals: to help individuals lead personally satisfying lives and become constructive members of society. The theory and methodology of Raths and colleagues (values clarification); Rokeach; Lasswell, Rucker, and colleagues; Kohlberg (moral development); and cognitive-decision-making theories are examined in this light, as are traditional approaches like moralizing and modeling. A synthesis of values-education objectives, derived from the various schools of thought, is proposed. Further research activities are suggested, with an emphasis on both furthering knowledge in each of the separate approaches and in undertaking some major integrative studies which address basic issues in the field. Specific development and dissemination activities are also advocated. A final section briefly examines the general community reaction to values education.

Delineation of the Values-Education Field

My first challenge is to delineate the field known as "values education." I think of this as a rather broad area, including some aspects of affective education, the moral-development approach, the cognitive-decision-making approach, and other components of moral and citizenship education. The editors, however, have chosen to factor out the values theorists, the developmentalists, the cognitive-decision makers,

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This paper also appears, with minor modifications, in The School's Role As Moral Authority, a booklet published by the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1977.

and the prosocial behaviorists from the general field of moral and citizenship education and ask that each group be dealt with separately. Given my own integrative conception of values education, I am going to have some difficulty doing this. I will try to remain within the proposed framework, but from time to time this paper will incorporate other theories and educational approaches.

Common Goals

At first glance, it might seem that one of the most difficult problems in the field of values education is to get the theorists and practitioners from different schools to agree on a set of overriding goals. On the contrary, I would like to suggest that most values/moral/citizenship educators share a common set of objectives, which can be clustered around two overall goals: (a) to help people become more fulfilled and satisfied with the quality of their lives, and (b) to help them become more constructive members of the groups of which they are a part, i.e., in their relationships, families, task groups, social groups, and societies.

These two general goals can be stated more explicitly. To expand the first: When life has value for us, we prize and cherish more of our choices, beliefs, and activities. We experience a stronger self-concept and feel greater meaning in life. We are less apathetic and flighty, more purposeful and committed. This does not mean we are always "happy." It

means that we are living vitally, experiencing the richness of ourselves, others, and the world around us as we move toward self-selected, meaningful ends. I suggest this is one generally agreed-upon goal of values education.

The second goal deals with being socially constructive, which, it seems to me, means to act in a way that promotes the values of life and liberty. Liberty encompasses the values of freedom, justice, and equality. Stated differently, to be socially constructive helps create the conditions which permit others the freedom to pursue lives that will be fulfilling and satisfying to <u>them</u>.

I have never encountered a serious advocate of moral, citizenship, or values education who disagreed fundamentally with these two goals. It is true that some approaches have emphasized the development of personally satisfying values, while others have stressed the development of socially constructive attitudes and action; still others have focused on both areas. However, no educational point of view, to my knowledge, has stated as its goal the cultivation of unfulfilled, purposeless individuals or social misfits.

Some examples: Values clarification (Raths, Harmin, & Simon, 1966), one of the most popular values-education approaches in the schools, has emphasized the importance of helping people discover and build into their lives that which they truly prize and cherish. This is clearly consistent

with the first goal mentioned above. Values clarification is also explicit about encouraging people to consider the consequences of their choices--both personal and social consequences. Here both goals are addressed. In its methodology, values clarification encourages respect for all viewpoints and autonomy for individuals; it thereby implicitly affirms the importance of individual growth, but not at the expense of those around one. Explicitly and implicitly, then, this values-education approach supports the two broad goals mentioned above.

Milton Rokeach, a pioneer in the fields of attitude change and values theory, also reflects both goals of values education. He writes:

> The school has not only always been in the business of inculcating, shaping and modifying certain values, but should be in this business. Society depends upon the educational institution to successfully inculcate educational values. (Rokeach, 1975, p. 124)

Among educational values he includes "a sense of accomplishment, self-respect, wisdom, freedom and equality" and refers to "what are perhaps the ultimate educational values--individual growth and self-realization" (p. 125).

Another values-education approach popularized by Rucker, Arnspiger, and Brodbeck (1969), based on a theory of values developed by Harold Lasswell (1951), affirms the importance of eight values as a goal for human development and education: respect, wealth, power, enlightenment, skill,

rectitude, well-being, and affection. As Lasswell defines these values, they fall very nicely in line with either or both of the goals for values education--personal effectiveness and social commitment.

Many religious-education programs have similar goals for the values development of their constituents, young and old alike. The good life is defined by most religions as acting charitably toward one's neighbor, pursuing a larger, transcendental purpose or meaning in life, and enjoying the goodness of all creation in the process. The YMCA, for example, has recently launched a major values-education program of national scope, based largely on the values-clarification approach and affirming the importance of individual growth and social responsibility. Many new publications in religious education make the same connection (e.g., Larson & Larson, 1976).

This agreement on the broader goals of values education is not confined only to those theorists who have been identified as values theorists for the purpose of the 1976 Conference on Moral/Citizenship Education; agreement is shared by other moral/citizenship education schools of thought. Certainly the chief concern of the moral developmentalists has been the promotion of higher levels of moral reasoning--e.g., the values of reciprocity, fairness, and the "just" community. Prefacing an excellent yearbook that describes a

values-analysis approach to values education, the president of the National Council for the Social Studies voices the same concerns:

> Societies today, as they have for thousands of years, embrace a system of values that rejects killing, stealing, lying and cheating....While we invest a million dollars on cancer research presumably to preserve human life, we spend billions on systems designed to destroy life....The same community that is aroused over the spread of venereal disease among its young will not allow sex education in its school curriculum. (Metcalf, 1971, pp. v-vi)

His frustration with an education that has failed to achieve its potential in human welfare is apparent in every example, and he expresses the dissatisfaction of many values educators. They too are not happy with the status quo.

People are confused and conflicted about their values, say the values clarifiers. In individual lives the symptoms are apathy, flightiness, overconformity, excessive dissenting, and other behaviors indicative of a lack of values or of values confusion. Ultimately such confusion can lead to the absence of perceived purpose in living--a state of disorder or suffering. Individual values problems can also affect relationships, contribute to considerable conflict within families and groups, encourage inefficiency, and lead to a reduction of constructive activity in society. Society can ill afford such a loss. Nations around the globe suffer from similar values confusion, performing great acts of charity and construction with one hand and moral atrocities and

environmental destruction with the other. The very survival of the planet is endangered by such values conflicts, say the values clarifiers (e.g., Kirschenbaum, Harmin, Howe, & Simon, 1975).

Other values educators agree. Rucker et al. (1969) see young people suffering from "value deprivations"--alienation, lack of self-respect, powerlessness--in other words, the opposite of Lasswell's eight values mentioned above. Rokeach (1973) finds inconsistencies between the end values people say they hold and the means they use to achieve these values. Moral developmentalists see most people operating at relatively low levels of moral reasoning. In a study that may be apocryphal (although if it were true I would not be surprised), it was established that the Bill of Rights, if put to a referendum today, would be defeated by a whopping majority. Not surprisingly, cognitive-decision-making theorists are concerned about the lack of logic and critical thinking applied to contemporary social discourse and decision making.

Values-Education Approaches

In short, values educators believe that conscious pedagogical strategies must be employed if we are to move from the present rather unhappy state of affairs to one characterized by the two broad goals of values education. In

effect we have the dilemma of moving from point a to point c. Point a is characterized as lacking in values clarity and critical-thinking skills and operating at low levels of moral reasoning; social issues and crises receive only the most token recognition, analysis, or corrective action. We are now at point a--as children, frequently as adults, and as a society. Point b is the intervention the educator employs to move to point c. The latter position is defined by clearer purposes, enthusiasm, sharpness of thinking, higher levels of moral reasoning, and the social commitment to recognize problems, analyze them thoughtfully, and take bold and effective action. The problem of values education, therefore, is very simple: How do we help people move from point a to point c? In the context of public education, how do we help students move along the developmental continuum to greater values maturity?

Parents, teachers, religious leaders, and other helpers have been intervening for thousands of years, of course, attempting to influence the values development of their charges. More recently, psychologists and educators have devised interventions based on more precise theories of how values develop and change--theories usually tested by varying degrees of empirical research.

One of the most traditional approaches to values education--not one built on a strong foundation of theory and

research but nevertheless successful for centuries when a less complex world presented fewer choices--is that of moralizing. Gently or forcefully, subtly or harshly, the moralizer tells young people what to do, what to think, what is right or wrong, good or bad. There is often a great deal of wisdom or caring attached to such moralizing. The problem, of course, is that different teachers may tell children different things. Their parents, ministers, and peer groups may also tell them different things, as may the mass media, the politicians, sports heroes, and movie stars. In fact, young people are probably bombarded from all sides with different messages about what values to pursue and what goals to strive for in order to achieve, to belong, to be popular, and to succeed with the opposite sex. The moralizer adds his or her individual input; but then, how does the young person sort it all out?

Many do not. They grow into adults who are easily influenced by the most persuasive moralizers and so are filled with contradictions among their values and inconsistencies between their beliefs and behavior, thus easy prey to the adman's version of reality, the demagogue's lie, or peer group pressure toward conformity.

Another traditional values-education approach is that of modeling, in which the model is a living example of the values in which he or she believes. One of the best ways to

teach anything is to present a concrete example of it. Young people today are quick to spot adults who say one thing and do another. Unfortunately, though, the problem of multiple values remains. There are too many models modeling different values--different goals, life-styles, speech patterns, moral codes, orientations toward work and play, life and death. Which models are the real teachers, which the charlatans? How does one decide?

Because the traditional methods of moralizing and modeling fail to teach young people a process by which they can analyze much of the confusing information about their world and learn to make their own decisions--a process by which they can pick the best and reject the worst of all the moralizing and modeling they are continually subjected to--most of the recent values-education approaches have provided a different type of intervention aimed at getting from point a to point c. Proponents of these new plans recognize that moralizing and modeling will continue to exist as alternative avenues of values education, but they argue that the old forms are not sufficient to do the job. Let me describe some of the newer approaches.

Values clarification tries to teach people a process which can be applied to values choices throughout life. This process consists of seven subprocesses, first defined by Raths et al. (1966): (a) choosing from alternatives,

(b) choosing after considering consequences, (c) choosing freely, (d) prizing and cherishing one's choices, (e) publicly affirming one's choices, (f) acting on one's choices, and (g) acting with repetition and pattern in one's choices. The values-clarification methodology consists of hundreds of different classroom or group "strategies" or activities that are designed to help people learn these processes and to give them practice in applying them to values-laden areas in their lives (Simon et al., 1972). Values-clarification approaches for dealing with school subjects are also employed (Harmin et al., 1973). Research on values-clarification provides tentative support for the claim that this intervention helps achieve the goals of values education without any loss (and often with a gain) to school subject-matter goals (Kirschenbaum, 1975).

Milton Rokeach's work (1975) on values is not so much an educational approach at this stage as an experimental approach to investigating how values may be changed by outside manipulation. He continues to demonstrate that values change in a predictable direction when subjects are shown discrepancies between what they say they personally value and what other groups with which the subjects identify claim to value. In all of Rokeach's experiments the change is in the direction of more socially constructive values and behavior, as defined above. (He refuses to conduct his experiments in the

opposite direction, to see if the same discrepancy theory would still apply.)

Rucker et al. (1969) use many activities akin to values clarification as well as many materials they and their colleagues have developed, all centered around Lasswell's eight values dimensions. Students thereby continue to understand and internalize these eight values more deeply and to comprehend how the values dimensions are related to their lives.

Moral developmentalists in the Kohlbergian tradition intervene by posing values dilemmas for students to consider and by facilitating discussions in which several different levels of moral reasoning are likely to be present. Research by the moral developmentalists indicates that under the right conditions, progression up the stages of moral reasoning is the inevitable result.

Other educators intervene in the cognitive and decision-making areas by teaching students analytical and critical-thinking skills (e.g., Raths, Wasserman, Jonas, & Rothstein, 1967) and the structure of logic and/or decision-making skills, all of which are essential for more effective personal and social choices.

Common Ground among Values-Education Approaches

Other specific directions in values education could be mentioned, and it is possible to spend a great deal of time

contrasting them. I find it more useful at this point to consider the common ground among the various values-education approaches taken most seriously and used most widely today; for in that area of overlap I see the possibility of some clarity about the future of values education.

First, all these approaches try to teach young people (and adults) a set of valuing skills or valuing processes. The concept of skills is very useful, I think, because we are on secure ground in communicating with educators and the community if we refer to that widely accepted function of schools--teaching skills. Therefore, if we could take from each of the values-education approaches those skills which seem critical to the development of personally satisfying and socially constructive living, we would really have something important--a set of specific objectives for values education which could be agreed upon and measured.

I have previously (Kirschenbaum, 1973) tried to formulate such a list of valuing skills, representing those skills or processes emphasized by the various approaches mentioned above and some from others--for instance, effectiveness training (Gordon, 1970, 1975) and reevaluation counseling (Jackins, 1965)--not yet cited. The skills cluster under what I would call the five "dimensions" of the overall valuing process:

Thinking

- Thinking on many levels (e.g., Bloom, Engelhart, Furst, Walker, & Krathwohl, 1956)
- Critical thinking (e.g., Raths et al., 1967; Metcalf, 1971)
- Divergent creative thinking (e.g., Parnes, 1967)
- Moral reasoning (e.g., Kohlberg, 1968)

Feeling

- Being aware of one's feelings (e.g., Rogers, 1961)
- Discharging distressful feelings (Jackins, 1965)
- Experiencing positive self-esteem (e.g., Norem-Hebeisen, 1976)

Choosing or Decision Making

- Goal setting
- Data gathering
- Choosing from alternatives (Raths et al., 1966)
- Choosing after considering consequences (Raths et al., 1966)
- Choosing freely (Raths et al., 1966)
- Soliciting feedback about the results

Communicating

- Sending clear messages (e.g., Gordon, 1970)
- Empathic listening (e.g., Gordon, 1970; Rogers, 1951)
- "No lose" conflict resolution (e.g., Gordon, 1970)

Acting

- Acting skillfully and competently, including:
  (a) academic skills
  (b) professional skills
  (c) personal-social skills

These dimensions of valuing overlap; they are not discrete psychological processes. For example, one may think, communicate, and act simultaneously. The skills are not necessarily used in the order in which they are presented here; their order depends upon the context and the person. Finally, this list is not meant to be definitive. One can add or delete a given skill, or use different terms, depending upon personal orientation.

The list, then, is not the product of any one school of thought but an integration of many approaches to values education. I suggest that it is possible to state the following as the main hypothesis of values education, based on the separate theories of each school represented and on the research each school has conducted: The consistent, skillful, and appropriate use of specific valuing processes increases the likelihood that our lives and our choices will have value for ourselves and will be constructive in the social context. This statement implies that the entire field of values education can be clarified toward the objective of teaching a definable set of skills.

As a part of teaching the various valuing skills, different methods provide students with practice in using the skills and applying them to values-laden areas in their lives. Sometimes the practice uses abstract issues or moral dilemmas that are distant from students' immediate concerns;

this is true of the Kohlberg model and occasionally of the values-analysis model. However, approaches such as values clarification and the Rucker et al. (1969) model tend to give students practice in using the valuing skills by having them think about, discuss, and act on real issues in their lives--family, friends, school, leisure time, and the like. All the strategies are workable with socially important content.

In any case, the goal is the same--to reinforce the skills which have been learned, or which are being learned, and to encourage students to apply the skills across the range of human experience, including their own lives.

Another thing which many of the approaches have in common is the creation of discrepancies or dissonance in a person's thinking, intended as a step toward moral development. Values clarification puts great emphasis on exposing students to alternative belief and action models. Moral developmentalists stress the importance of exposing students to levels of moral reasoning one stage above their own. Rokeach (1973), as we have noted, highlights the dissonance created when experimental subjects find that a reference group they admire has responded differently than they did to a similar values survey.

Each of these viewpoints postulates, explicitly or implicitly, that such an exposure to alternative frames of

reference contributes to a positive change in values or level of moral reasoning. The research of any one of these schools of thought could be used to help explain the methodology of the other schools. There seems to be a developing consistency in our understanding of how values grow and change.

Present State of the Art

So where are we in values education? To summarize the previous discussion, we have a number of approaches, each with its own theoretical base, materials, methods, and research support. Most eschew any attempt to inculcate specific values regarding religion, politics, and the like, but these schools are not values-free. Implicitly or explicitly, they affirm certain values consistent with a democratic philosophy.

I have suggested that there are two key values or goals that they all share: First is the inalienable right of the individual to a personally fulfilling life. Second are the principles of freedom, justice, and equality--in a word, liberty. The founders of this country stated simply that these truths, or values, of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness were "self-evident."

We can do more than that today. There is a tradition now in psychological research (e.g, Kohlberg, 1969; Rogers, 1964) which suggests that these values are also natural or

universal. That still is no ultimate proof of their desirability, but the suggestion of their universality adds credence to the growing number of educational approaches aimed at equipping students with the skills and attitudes necessary to the fulfillment of Jefferson's dream.

Where Do We Go from Here?

Beginning with John Dewey, the concern with citizenship education has played an important part in the language of modern pedagogy. The recent renaissance in values education is a continuation of that tradition, based on a firmer foundation of psychological theory and research. But in many ways, we are still only at the beginning stages of development in this area.

We should examine two areas of future effort: (a) research and development, i.e., the generation of new knowledge and technique, and (b) dissemination, i.e., the implementation on a broad scale of the best knowledge and techniques presently available.

Research

I see the need for two kinds of research and development in this area--what I would call specific and integrative.

Specific research and development efforts should be aimed at helping the most promising projects involving moral/values/citizenship education continue their good work. Areas

such as values clarification, moral development, values analysis, and the like are worthy of further support because they are consistent with democratic educational goals, they have some empirical research base, and they have demonstrated the ability to appeal to broad segments of the population. In other words, people use these approaches; and the approaches affect the lives of children.

Each of these schools has important concerns which should be pursued: For example, at what grade levels is a given strategy most effective? What kinds of students do or do not profit from certain approaches or certain kinds of interventions? What teacher-training models in a given methodology lead to the greatest positive change in teacher and student behavior?

The specific schools of thought should be enabled to pursue each question separately, thereby generating new information on the nature of values and moral development and the means of influencing moral/values/citizenship development in public education.

This is not to say that every proposal using the words values, morals, or the like should be funded. Personally, I have been asked to consult with many values-education projects seeking funding; but often, after examining a proposal, I have felt that the project would add little that was new in terms of research or development. Although the funds

requested might have provided needed teacher training in a given district, I question whether in the long run the money would have been spent wisely.

There is certainly room for valid disagreement among people in the field as to what research should or should not be funded; I will simply caution that we have considerable knowledge about values education at this point and, rather than continue to reinvent the wheel, we should be willing to fund less pedestrian programs which might have far-reaching consequences.

Why not, for example, go to some of the leaders in the different values-education areas who have distinguished themselves and ask: "If you had x number of dollars to explore any questions which you think are critical in your area, what would you propose?" I venture to say that out of this would come some ideas which might lead to noteworthy research efforts in American education.

In any event, developmental work in the separate approaches should go forward, even to the point of funding entire schools to be set up according to the educational philosophy of the various values-education models, with the results, problems, and successes carefully monitored.

A second type of needed research, in my opinion, would be integrative in nature and frequently longitudinal. Let me give two examples.

If two common goals of values education are, in fact, the achievement of a personally satisfying life and socially constructive behavior, we might find or create the instruments best suited to measuring those two phenomena. We might then form a variety of experimental groups and provide each with an educational experience over several years which would utilize a particular values-education approach. Such an experiment could tell us which techniques are more effective for what ends, what kinds of students work best with each, and the like. The experiment would both increase our knowledge about values growth and development in general and provide an important validity check on the claims made by the individual values approaches.

Another kind of integrative research effort would be to examine more closely the array of valuing skills I identified earlier in this paper. Again, we could identify or create the instruments which would best measure the individual's skill in utilizing each valuing process. This would enable us to distinguish the "high valuing person" (the one who thinks critically, chooses from alternatives, etc.) from the "low valuing person" (the one who does not distinguish fact from opinion, chooses the first alternative which comes along, etc.). An enormous amount of significant data could be derived from a cross-sectional study of thousands of people of all ages, races, and backgrounds, measuring their

degree of valuing skills and correlating this factor with job and life satisfaction, citizenship behaviors (e.g., do they vote? write letters to the editor?), health, family adjustment, and so on. Are the valuing skills correlated with "success" for all people or just for some ages, races, etc.? Are all the valuing skills important, or are only selected skills important, or are some skills more important than others? Will a factor analysis show that each valuing skill is a distinct factor, or that some groupings allow us to combine several valuing skills into one category and thus further clarify the specific skills to pursue in values education? The possibilities are endless.

What I am suggesting is that we need to back away a bit from some of the narrower specific questions and tackle some of the biggest and most important questions in values education, which transcend any specific values-education approaches: For example, What would the product of an ideal values/moral education look like? How can we best achieve that kind of result?

I sometimes wonder if there is not a fear among funding sources to tackle this kind of task. It probably seems much safer to fund 10 different projects for $100,000 each than one project for $1 million; safer politically and in the sense that with 10 projects, somebody is bound to come up with something worthwhile, whereas with one project, you

never know. I suggest that one well-selected, larger project might, in the long run, take us further than 10 projects which are smaller or narrower in scope. Fortunately, it is not an either-or situation. Both kinds of projects deserve support. Still, I think that more daring is necessary in funding some experiments that can demonstrate almost conclusively certain major premises about values education and thereby focus all our work in even more productive directions for years to come.

Dissemination

While this kind of research goes on, we need to do the best we can with the knowledge we have. How do we inform the largest number of educators about the better values-education materials and methods which are currently available?

Demonstration schools. Schools using the different values-education approaches are one method; they can expose thousands of visiting educators to concrete examples of important educational models. The use of demonstration schools is also consistent with current programs supporting schools and centers which exhibit promising approaches.

Three other means of dissemination constitute the major programs of my own organization--the National Humanistic Education Center. Let me explain these.

Teacher training. It has been my experience that administrators and teachers develop a commitment to values

education of the kind I have been describing primarily by participating actively in a workshop, class, or learning experience characterized by such a learning approach. Only when educators experience a concrete example of this approach do they become motivated to change their teaching behavior significantly. All school district policy statements include references to moral or citizenship education; but it is so hard to effect competently that most people steer clear of it.

Funds for teacher training in this area help encourage these kinds of learning experiences. But it is better still to set up some kind of system whereby funds are made available for the education of in-house trainers. Districts could be paid for sending teachers or administrators (volunteers) to, say, a regional workshop provided the districts agree to have these people return to conduct further training in the district.

Films of some of the major values-education approaches in operation in real classrooms can be an excellent aid to disseminating our present methods on a wide scale. The films could become an important part of in-service training and could be lent to districts across the country at minimal expense.

Development of materials. In the area of materials for education, there has been a great deal written in the field

of values education. Superka, Johnson, and Ahrens (1975) have provided one model for analyzing materials in the field. Our National Humanistic Education Center is compiling a catalogue of materials for teachers which shows how to teach the valuing skills and deal with values issues in specific subject areas such as English, history, mathematics, and science. We have found in the past that when we publish such listings, drawing together in one source all the materials available, thousands of districts, schools, and individual teachers write in for the materials. Would it be too commercial to suggest that an agency like the National Institute of Education set up, or contract with a nonprofit organization to set up, a clearinghouse to make available at cost the best and most useful materials in the field of values education? I am not suggesting a complete list of everything that has been written in the field, with a long computer printout that provides little or no guidance. I mean a narrow selection of the most practical materials which teachers can use to implement values education. Our Center has had a great deal of success with its offering, and I see no reason why such a service could not be implemented on a wider scale.

Support groups. The third means of dissemination which we are using at the National Humanistic Education Center is that of support groups. We have written a Manual for Professional Support Groups (Kirschenbaum & Glaser, 1976) and are

now field-testing it in several localities. Our hypothesis is that peer, professional-learning, and support groups can become effective vehicles to disseminate promising new self-help methods, to facilitate means by which educators learn about new methods from each other, and to provide the emotional and professional support which innovators so often need.

These means of dissemination have great potential, I think, for reaching a wide audience of educators across the country. Many have been used in other areas, e.g., individualized instruction and career education. They could readily be used in the field of values, moral, and citizenship education.

Community Reaction

How does the community at large react to all this? I have suggested that most values educators, if they could separate themselves a bit from vested interests in their own approaches, would agree on broad goals and specific objectives for values education. Are most parents, religious leaders, and community members ready to go along?

I do not know of extensive research that answers this. Questionnaires given to parents and others often tend to reflect the biases of the surveyor. If we were to ask, "Do you believe the schools have a responsibility in helping

children become good citizens?" or "Do you believe that schools should help give students the skills to build personally satisfying lives and be constructive members of society?" it is obvious that the vast majority would respond favorably. If, on the other hand, we asked, "Do you think schools should take on the responsibility (previously left to the home and the church) of teaching values?" most people would answer negatively. Questionnaire data on community opinion must be viewed very cautiously; in my experience, it is almost always motivated by, and used as, political strategy for some individual or group wanting to implement a particular philosophy.

My opinion on community reaction to values education is that parents, religious leaders, and others sincerely desire the broad goals of values education mentioned above; they want children to lead purposeful, satisfying lives, and they want them to be constructive members of the community. They also sincerely want children to have the valuing skills to obtain these two broad objectives. However, when certain controversial issues are involved, some members of the community prefer that children not be exposed to specific points of view or even to the issues themselves. Such exposure, they feel, threatens their own authority and could be harmful to the children.

I hasten to point out that this rarely becomes a major

problem for values education. Normally values educators use common sense about possible or actual community reaction. By using good taste and occasionally avoiding controversial issues which are certain to create strong feelings and polarization, the overall values-education program is allowed to continue intact. In cases where individual parents are strongly against their children's participation in a certain aspect of the values-education program, alternative learning experiences can be provided. Adequate teacher preparation, administrative support, and continuing emphasis on basic academic skills will all help ensure the longevity of the program. With this kind of responsible implementation, the majority of parents respond positively to values education. I would estimate that values clarification, the approach I am most familiar with, has been implemented in thousands of districts across the country. I find it significant that I have heard of only a dozen incidents where it became a source of serious community controversy.

In the small minority of cases where there is vigorous community opposition to values, moral, and citizenship education, the schools are faced with a dilemma not unique to values education. Who ultimately controls the schools? Parents, taxpayers, teachers, administrators, students, school boards, and even the courts all make some claim to a decision-making role. Until the problem of control is

resolved by society as a whole, then values education--like busing, school financing, community involvement, segregation, and other issues--will be merely the battleground on which a more basic issue is fought.

In most districts, however, values education will continue to be more like most educational innovations. Can it be supported on its merits? Can it win adherents? Can it continue to survive and flourish, or will it go the way of other educational fads and panaceas? I think we have the evidence to show that values education, moral education, citizenship education is more than a fad; it is supported by a growing base of sound theory and research and, more important, is crucial for the well-being of our society.

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IMMEDIATE NEEDS IN VALUES EDUCATION: COMMENTS ON HOWARD KIRSCHENBAUM'S PAPER

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Agreeing with Kirschenbaum's central concerns, the author takes issue with Kirschenbaum's proposed synthesis of values-education theories and with his slighting of the social context of values education. However, the author shares Kirschenbaum's hopes for values education within American education and expands upon his proposed dissemination networks.

Taking on a vast topic, Kirschenbaum rambles across the values-education field pointing to a few differences among the many values theorists and practitioners. His message is optimistic, using noun-names for values (e.g., justice, freedom) to point out agreement across the field. I agree with his optimism about the interest in values education, but I do not agree with his grounds.

Points at Issue

Certainly values educators might agree on the noun-names for values. But there are fundamental differences about how these values fit together into both individual commitments (and action) and societal aspirations (and action). Kirschenbaum glosses over the significant differences in method, styles, conception, and psychological basis which are at the root of heated controversy among values educators. These

controversies are real, and they are perplexing to classroom teachers, who must make instructional decisions today.

Kirschenbaum proposes a synthesis which is fundamentally a list of many competing approaches to values education (under his label of "skills"). However, there are several problems with this. First, while such a list, which includes everyone's particular concern in values education, may make many happy because they get a piece of the action, solid theory for instruction cannot be based upon such a pedagogical smorgasbord. The synthesis needs to have more fundamental unity than appears in Kirschenbaum's justification. We need to know how and why these pieces fit together, what they look like in a program for instruction, and so forth. Matters of substance cannot be reduced to a "process" or two and still serve as a useful basis for moral education.

Second, Kirschenbaum's synthesis makes values education such a vast field that it becomes the entire social education of children and adults. Perhaps that is the truth of the matter--that values education is social education. But if we accept this statement, then our term values education loses its content and meaning and we ought to simply discuss social education.

Third, Kirschenbaum's presentation reflects a weakness in the field of values education; i.e., much of the debate

focuses upon the form of values-education methods and procedures, while ignoring the function. We need a more intensive dialogue on the function of values education--its goals and significance for the social system--and the place of schools (formal education) within the values-education concerns of the larger community.

Similarly, Kirschenbaum's argument reflects the values-education debate which turns on the technology: How can it be accomplished? Which is more effective--values clarification or cognitive moral development? And so on. Not enough of his argument confronts the ends sought by values educators. In dialogue with the wider community, values educators, indeed all educators, need to deal with such social and philosophical questions as: What is the moral person? What kind of moral person do our communities desire? What life goals and societal aspirations are the finest human commitments toward which we should strive together? What kinds of life-styles and what kinds of societies are worthy of our commitment and our striving (as values educators, parents, etc.)? The gist of this dialogue is available to us. My point is that as values educators we have not dealt with the issues in any systematic fashion. More important, we have not engaged in such dialogue with the larger community over the function and goals of values education in the schools. (For example, many values educators see the calling

to their craft through the image of the prophet, while the wider community sees the public school with kingly and priestly functions, not prophetic roles!)

Kirschenbaum's paper, and the field of values education, ignores sociology. We are given a view of values education that focuses upon the education and development of the individual. We tend to ignore the social setting in which values education and socialization take place, with the exception of a few critical remarks in passing. However, our efforts as values educators might better be directed to the education of parents and ourselves rather than the children. It may be impossible to carry out values education for children and adults--the way Kirschenbaum and others indicate--within the social institutions which we have created. It may be impossible to carry out values education for children in the schools as we know them, in the family climate and structures which we have created. Certainly cultural anthropologists and sociologists have, or may have, something to tell us about our predicament with regard to the institutions which we have shaped and which continue to shape us.

Turning to specific needs in the area of research, development, and dissemination, I suggest that the major need of educators is to get on with what we now think we know. That is, we need to organize and use what we know, reflect upon some of the basic issues in the field, and use the

resulting decisions and commitments to act, while researchers continue their efforts. One cannot wait upon the other.

Recommendations for Dissemination

In this vein, I see community-awareness education as a primary dissemination activity. There is not much consensus concerning what schools are about in our society, and we need an open dialogue in as many forums as possible to wrestle with questions surrounding the mission of education (formal and nonformal) in a free society. The goals of moral/citizenship education should be part of that discussion. The attempt would be to build an aware and supportive citizenry, a constituency for the programs to be undertaken by educators. In this effort the issues must be identified and confronted directly. Necessary vehicles for dissemination include the electronic media, newspapers and periodicals, public forums, community seminars, conferences, and short courses. While this proposal has an idealistic ring to it, efforts to develop and sustain moral-education programs will falter unless they are perceived as an integral part of the educational process by a significant constituency.

Second, we need a major dissemination program directed to educators, wherever they are based (schools, universities, youth programs, etc.), which deals with the following: (a) alternative conceptions of moral/citizenship education,

(b) public-policy and educational issues involved in moral/citizenship education programs, (c) the use of philosophical and empirical research findings, (d) analysis and evaluation of existing materials and strategies, and (e) evaluation procedures appropriate to moral/citizenship education. Kirschenbaum's dissemination program--roughly akin to the agricultural model--is a useful one. Probably the greatest impact can come from establishing a variety of values/citizenship education centers within an array of educational systems, e.g., schools, religious organizations, regional laboratories, universities, and state departments of education.

The activities for such centers would vary with the nature of the system sponsoring the center and the personnel available. At Florida State University we are in the process of establishing a values-education center, with core support from the university. Faculty members from a variety of academic departments will serve on an advisory board with state educators. Professors, students, and teachers will be recruited to work on ad hoc programs developed by the center and supported by the center or by outside agencies. Following is a list of the proposed functions of the center, in order of priority:

1. Identify and collect research literature, theoretical papers, and instructional program materials. These "library"

holdings will be readily accessible in one place for users in target audiences.

2. Analyze and evaluate existing instructional programs, yielding revision and adaptation information for potential users in target audiences.

3. Disseminate and exchange research, theoretical, and instructional program information, with the center serving as a link between those in target audiences and state, national, and international values educators. The quantity and quality of information on values education available to our target audiences will be increased by means of newsletters, occasional papers and reports, conferences and public lectures, and academic and commercial publications (books, journal articles).

4. Assist various agencies and individuals in the use, dissemination, and diffusion of values-education programs and information.

5. Assist in the development of public-awareness and community-education programs designed to build understanding and support for values-education programs in educative systems.

6. Provide in-service and preservice training for professional personnel in target audiences by means of workshops, seminars, and short courses; self-instructional

media and correspondence courses; and credit and noncredit courses (on and off campus).

7. Respond to the expressed concerns of personnel in target audiences for needs assessments, resource inventories, and surveys relating to values education.

8. Assist various agencies and individuals in the design and development of instructional systems for values education.

9. Conduct, or assist in, the formative and summative evaluation of values-education instructional programs.

10. Conduct, or assist in, research efforts pertaining to values education.

This priority listing of objectives for the values-education center reflects my conception of what is most needed at this time; I think that it reflects Kirschenbaum's concerns as well.

Recommendations for Research

Beyond the two kinds of dissemination programs, we need research directed to the clarification of the issues involved in moral education. Much of this research is ethical-philosophical, psychological, and sociological work. For example, philosophers, theologians, and psychologists might grapple with questions concerning the nature and alternative definitions of the person, especially definitions of the

moral person. This integrative inquiry would confront questions about reason and emotions in moral behavior and the impact of socialization and social systems on both moral behavior and moral development. Social philosophers, political scientists, and others might discern alternative conceptions of society, with differing implications for moral behavior and moral development. Scholars in the area of sociology of knowledge and curriculum developers might labor together on styles of knowing and discerning meaning which are critical in moral/citizenship education. We would want to know which type of knowledge is most fruitful in moral education programs: (a) empirical-rational knowledge from the social, natural, and physical sciences; (b) personal knowledge and meaning derived from one's own experience and the experience of others; and/or (c) normative-critical knowledge wherein inquiry begins from an ideal model.

Such integrative research is truly a multidisciplinary reflection upon where we are, what we already know, and how to use existing knowledge and insights. Beyond this point, research and development should proceed to open areas and old questions about moral/citizenship education. But the thrust of our concern, as educators, should be identifying what we already have and using that effectively.

Future Directions

As I said earlier, I am optimistic about mounting a renewed commitment to values education in educational systems. Concerned persons may find hope, if not comfort, in the way things are going. At least two factors are encouraging.

First, an increasing concern within many sectors of our society about values confusion and anomie is reflected in many personal decisions and public policies. Statements by political leaders, civic and professional groups, and leaders in various religious traditions have indicated that the time to take concerted action is now. While the conceptions of the problem sometimes may be distorted and the goals for ameliorating the problem sometimes misguided, the array of public concern is impressive.

Second, recent research in moral/values development within the social sciences, coupled with institutional analysis and more traditional humanistic knowledge, yields the guiding insights for moral/values development programs. While not conclusive, the knowledge and skills we now have lend us the power to take action together. We can design institutions that encourage and support the development of individual potential, that foster the re-creation of values, and that further the commitments to justice. We can design programs together that function to sustain moral/values

development of individuals, to support commitments to social justice, and to enhance the moral vision and habits which are complementary to social participation.

The opportunity exists for education to respond to the values concerns of persons within our communities. The talent exists for such responses. The resources are available, even in an era of austerity, for mounting and sustaining such efforts.

A PERSPECTIVE ON AXIOLOGICAL ADEQUACY--SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR VALUES EDUCATION: COMMENTS ON HOWARD KIRSCHENBAUM'S PAPER

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The author suggests new directions for values education--not recommended by Kirschenbaum--implied by a claim involving a perspective on axiological adequacy. This term refers to criteria, such as consistency and comprehensiveness, which are used to judge the adequacy of a values theory with respect to such aspects as its conceptions of values and values reasoning and its normative principles. Implications for goals include identifying possible criteria for axiological adequacy of students' values and the desirability of these for goals. Implications for intervention include identifying possible activities and combinations of such activities (procedures and strategies) to achieve the desirable goals. Kirschenbaum, however, does not clearly incorporate axiological adequacy either in goals or intervention. R&D suggestions focus mainly on measurement and emphasize its complexity. The author distinguishes 3 interrelated kinds of validity: conceptual, content, and construct. Finally, 3 kinds of plausible rival hypotheses need to be minimized in construct validation: value, value-related, and nonvalue.

This brief response will be restricted to the first three sections of Kirschenbaum's paper: those sections concerning the goals of values education, kinds of intervention in the schools, and research and development. Although

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Kirschenbaum's effort to be integrative and to take a broad perspective on values education is a worthy one, he is not sufficiently general or radical for the current needs of values education, especially the values-theory approaches. I would like to make three main points: (a) The values-theory approach needs new directions implied by a claim about axiological adequacy in values education. (b) The new directions implied by this claim involve goals of values education, kinds of intervention, and research and development. (c) Each of the three areas--goals, intervention, and research and development--requires a major effort because of its importance and complexity.

Points of Agreement

Before stating the claim and developing its implications both for Kirschenbaum's paper and for general discussion, let me indicate a number of points on which I am in essential agreement with Kirschenbaum.

Goals

Kirschenbaum points out that the end points or long-term goals, i.e., the values in a person's life, are not just specific behaviors; they are much more general and pervasive. They play a crucial role in certain "forms of life" (Wittgenstein, 1953) involving reasoned choice, action, planning, and the like. These forms of life are closely related

to what Rokeach (1973) refers to as the "functions" of a person's values system and what Rescher (1969) describes as a pervasive human phenomenon, i.e., planning actions and passing judgment on actions of oneself and others.

The emphasis on constructive aspects of group life reflects a general, and undoubtedly needed, societal shift to cooperative rather than competitive values.

Kinds of Intervention

Kirschenbaum points out that while moralizing and modeling have been traditional kinds of intervention, they both pose a difficult problem for the child. How can the child resolve the conflicts among moralizers or among models? Kirschenbaum identifies some current perspectives in values education, each of which attempts in some way to reduce or handle the problem faced by the child in the traditional approaches: values clarification, Rokeach's approach to values change (though not strictly a values-education approach); Rucker's approach; Kohlberg's approach of discussing moral dilemmas; and various approaches explicitly involving analytical and critical thinking.

Some common elements among these current approaches to values education can be identified, especially the clarification and development of processes and skills. (Kirschenbaum's main effort here, his integrative list of valuing processes and skills, however, does not incorporate

processes and skills from all these current approaches.) In addition, current approaches emphasize practice in applying these skills and, more important, help children with the problem of resolving conflict by creating a variety of conflict or dissonance situations for them to work out.

A skill approach to values education has the great advantage of building on the school's historical precedent of emphasizing the development of skills.

Research and Development

Support of the most promising values-education approaches is reasonable, although the criteria for support that Kirschenbaum gives need to be supplemented. (I suggest that further criteria for support involve some treatment of axiological adequacy in the values-education program; see below.) As part of the support, Kirschenbaum's suggestion to interview values educators who have achieved some "success" seems to be a fruitful one and would undoubtedly improve the results of this kind of support.

Measuring the extent to which Kirschenbaum's two broad goals of values education are achieved--using both existing and newly constructed measures--is a sound suggestion for existing and new values-education approaches.

The two "integrative" examples of studies are interesting, especially the second, which would yield some useful data.

The Perspective of Axiological Adequacy

In a recent presentation at an AERA symposium, Meux and Tucker (1976) proposed the following claim concerning values education, using the concept of axiological adequacy: If values education (some program or product) is not concerned with the improvement or development of the axiological adequacy of some aspect(s) of students' values in a broad sense --such as their values reasoning, their capabilities and dispositions for values reasoning, or their values systems --then it is not justifiable as values education.

Our claim thus agrees with Kohlberg (1971) on the fundamental importance in values education of the improvement or development of the adequacy of students' values--in some sense of adequacy and some sense of values--but differs slightly in our conceptualization of the nature and criteria of adequacy. Kohlberg (1971) uses the term philosophical adequacy (distinguishing it from psychological adequacy, in the sense of adjustment, mental health, purely affective processes, etc.), thus invoking some indefinite set of adequacy criteria associated with the philosophical literature, especially criteria for moral reasoning. However, in our judgment, the term axiological adequacy more accurately depicts the nature and scope of the criteria of adequacy appropriate for values education.

What is axiological adequacy? Since axiology is the

study of values (often designated as the theory of value or theory of values), axiological adequacy refers to the criteria of adequacy by which any theory of values is judged. For example, there are criteria for judging the adequacy of a theory of values with respect to its concept of values, its classification of values, its normative principles, its own criteria for the evaluation of values, the nature of values reasoning, and the like. Examples of such criteria of axiological adequacy are consistency, comprehensiveness, clarity, and congruence with fact.

Axiological adequacy is not restricted to the adequacy of moral theories, as in Kohlberg, but also includes the adequacy of values theories of any kind, whether they are theories of generic values or theories of specific values--aesthetic, economic, political, intellectual, and so forth. Moreover, axiological adequacy is concerned both with (a) metanormative questions in a values theory concerning the concept of values and the nature and justification of any kind of values reasoning; and (b) normative questions in a values theory concerning the adequacy of normative judgments, whether particular or general judgments, and whether judgments of values or obligation.

Figure 1 contains a variety of criteria of axiological adequacy, by no means a comprehensive list (Meux & Tucker, 1976).

Figure 1

Criteria of Axiological Adequacy Proposed in Values Literature

Parker (1957)

- Principle of attainment
- Principle of beneficence
- Principle of rank:
  - Duration
  - Volume (scope)
  - Height (self-transcendence)
  - Symbolism
  - Harmony
  - Intensity (primary, secondary)

Perry (1954)

- Preference
- Intensity
- Strength
- Duration
- Number
- Enlightenment
- Inclusiveness

Werkmeister (1967)

- Duration
- Intensity
- Harmony
- Level of self-involvement:
  - Felt values
  - Self-legislated values

Taylor (1961)

- Strength
- Importance
- Precedence

Coombs (1971)

- Truth
- Relevance
- Comprehensiveness
- Consistency

Whisner (1975)

- Consistency
- Comprehensiveness
- Congruence with fact (truth)

Edel (1961)

- Logical Standards:
  - Conceptual clarity
  - Methodological refinement
- Truth standards
- Comprehensiveness or completeness standpoint
- Orientational standpoint
- Functional standpoint

Brandt (1959)

- Consistency
- Generality

Some implications of the axiological-adequacy perspective for goals, kinds of intervention, and research and development--the topics of the first three sections of Kirschenbaum's paper--are discussed below. Although I will emphasize recommendations stemming from this perspective, I will also comment, where appropriate, upon Kirschenbaum's recommendations as viewed from the axiological-adequacy viewpoint.

Goals

From the perspective of axiological adequacy, what are the possible goals for values education? They involve developing the various aspects of axiological adequacy of the students' values--values reasoning, capabilities and dispositions for values reasoning, values systems, and the like. Specific examples include developing or improving the consistency of students' values systems, conformity of values reasoning to standards of rationality, clarity of values, and the strength and duration of values judged adequate by other criteria of axiological adequacy.

After identifying possible goals, it will be important to decide on their desirability singly and in combination. Priorities of the various criteria of axiological adequacy must be considered, as well as both the order and timing of goals and the optimal ages or stages of development for achieving them.

Thus as many criteria of axiological adequacy as possible must be identified in order to determine important relations among these criteria (such as empirical and conceptual, process and product); to evaluate the priorities, order, timing, etc., of the goals on the basis of these relations; and to select from all this the most desirable and perhaps even legitimate goals for values education. (Note that values clarification as a goal would be included in the criteria of axiological adequacy, but that it is only one of many adequacy criteria.)

From this perspective, Kirschenbaum's first goal for values education, personal satisfaction, is inappropriate because it does not clearly incorporate axiological adequacy. Thus, a person could be satisfied with values which are not clear, with values which are not consistent, with values which are not comprehensive, with values which are not congruent with existing fact, with values reasoning which is irrational, or other possibilities. It is interesting to note that an individual is likely to be satisfied with his values, whatever they are; furthermore, as Baier (1969) points out, it would be absurd for anyone to declare his values unsound (i.e., axiologically inadequate). A person believes his values to be sound whether or not they really are. More specifically, his values may involve self-deception and distortion, may lead to antisocial behavior, and may even be

characterized by any of the eight kinds of emotional problems discussed in Raths, Harmin, and Simon (1966).

Kinds of Intervention

What are the possible kinds of intervention for achieving the goals of values education? Considering the variety of possible goals, intervention will require a corresponding variety of skills, processes, tasks, activities, procedures, and strategies, some of which have already been identified in the values-education literature. However, other such activities need to be identified as well. Further, it may be especially fruitful to pursue different combinations of already specified activities, as well as new ones. A number of tasks, for example, have been described for formulating rational values judgments (Coombs & Meux, 1971) and other tasks noted for resolving values conflicts (Meux, 1971); clearly other relevant activities can be identified which, in various combinations with these tasks, and in different strategies and procedures, may vary considerably in their effectiveness for achieving the goals of values education.

The relevance of Kirschenbaum's recommended variety of processes and skills to axiological adequacy is not clear. Two examples are "discharging distressful feelings" and "sending clear messages." Further, he omits some skills clearly relevant to criteria of axiological adequacy already identified in values-education literature, e.g., assessing

the truth of purported facts, assessing the relevance of facts, and testing the consistency of one's values principle.

Research and Development

Although research and development include a variety of methodological matters (e.g., research design, statistical analysis, sampling, measurement, and evaluation), I will focus here only on some implications of the perspective on axiological adequacy for research design and measurement. Since Kirschenbaum mentions research design and measurement only in passing, this section will include only my own recommendations.

The central questions in research design concern internal and external validity. With regard to internal validity: have plausible rival hypotheses been sufficiently minimized to warrant the claim that some particular kind of intervention (skill, activity, strategy, etc.) achieves some particular goal(s) concerning axiological adequacy? With regard to external validity: if some particular kind of intervention (skill, activity, strategy, etc.) achieves some particular goal(s) concerning axiological adequacy in some particular situation, to what school situations can this be generalized?

If the internal-validity question cannot be answered in the affirmative, then the particular intervention cannot be justified as achieving some particular goal(s). Thus, even if improvement in students' axiological adequacy is observed,

it cannot be argued that such improvement is attributable to the intervention itself. It may be due, according to one plausible rival hypothesis, to the kind of development of adequacy Kohlberg describes in his theory (1971) as occurring naturally, much of it probably in nonschool settings.

If the external-validity question cannot be answered, a variety of questions are raised which are not germane here.

The central question in measurement also concerns plausible rival hypotheses: Have plausible rival hypotheses been sufficiently minimized to warrant the claim or interpretation that a given test actually measures a construct corresponding to some criterion (or criteria) of axiological adequacy?

If this question cannot be answered in the affirmative, then even if we observe changes or improvement on the purported tests of criteria of axiological adequacy, we cannot justify claims that we are really achieving the goals themselves, whether by some particular intervention or any other factor. Thus, if a test is not valid and we assume it is, we may draw erroneous inferences about the success of some kind of intervention. On the basis of this inference, the intervention may not be modified to achieve the goal.

Although research design and measurement are closely related, measurement is of prior importance in certain ways; so I will focus on measurement in the following section.

The development of valid measures of criteria for axiological adequacy is complex. Construct validation is necessarily involved, along with its general complexities, such as the need for a theoretical network and a variety of validation methods (such as described by Cronbach, 1971). More specifically, the measurement of any aspect of values is not nearly so well-developed an area in psychometrics as is, for example, the measurement of abilities; and the measurement of axiological adequacy is even less well developed than other aspects of values (such as the well-known Allport-Vernon-Lindzey Study of Values, 1960). Thus the number of plausible rival hypotheses for interpreting any test as a measure of some criterion of axiological adequacy is rather large; it requires considerable research effort to reduce the number or plausibility of these rival hypotheses.

Taking into account the importance and complexity of the measurement situation, I will make three recommendations for developing measures of criteria of axiological adequacy: (a) Three distinct but interrelated types of validity are required, each necessary but not sufficient to answer the central measurement question for a given measure. These are conceptual validity, content validity, and construct validity. (b) For a given measure, the phases of test construction and validation should establish the three types of validity in the order listed: conceptual, content, and

construct. (c) Specialists should be trained to be competent in all three types of validity.

Since the second and third recommendations need no discussion here, I will confine my comments to the first.

Conceptual validity. Conceptual validity involves the soundness of the concept of some particular criterion (or criteria) of axiological adequacy to be measured. Conceptual analysis is the appropriate method to achieve this soundness. Such a conceptual analysis might involve, for example, the consideration of a variety of cases relevant to the concept, the formulation of a list of tentative criteria for (i.e., rules for the use of) the concept, and the testing of these tentative criteria by other cases.

Conceptual validity is important primarily for establishing the similarity of (a) the criteria proposed for the use of a concept to (b) the ordinary use of the concept. This similarity has consequences for the soundness of a given measure for values education. At this time the ordinary use of the concepts of the criteria for axiological adequacy must be fairly closely approximated. Otherwise, the greater the deviation from ordinary use, the less certain we are as to the relations between what a test measures and the need for and "mandate" for values education. (In philosophical terms, I am arguing for reportive rather than reformatory conceptual analyses.) Conceptual validity is also important to help

move from the general criteria of axiological adequacy to specific situations for a test (the AERA presentation [Meux & Tucker, 1976] provides an extended example of this move from the general to the specific); to help minimize plausible rival hypotheses, especially those concerning values-related phenomena such as satisfaction, attitudes, interests, beliefs, self-esteem; and to help specify the universe of admissible operations for content validity.

Content validity. Content validity involves the extent to which a set of items on a test is a representative sample from some universe. Cronbach (1971) points out that the specification of the universe actually involves the specification of a universe of admissible operations, i.e., operations the investigator considers to yield equivalent results. For our purposes, three important facets of the universe of admissible operations should be noted. The first facet involves the "substantive" part of the universe: the criteria for use of the concept in a class of values situations obtained from the conceptual analysis undertaken to establish conceptual validity. The second facet involves a set of task dimensions we discussed in the recent AERA presentation (Meux & Tucker, 1976): prediction versus judgment, evaluation of values versus description of values, comprehensive versus narrow, extensive versus intensive, abstract versus concrete, conflict versus nonconflict, and values state versus values

trait. These task dimensions specify kinds of activities for a test which are closely related to kinds of intervention activities. Thus a test may or may not involve a conflict situation, may or may not involve describing one's own values, and so on. However, these task dimensions, although important in determining equivalence in the universe of admissible operations, do not constitute the independent methods of data collection required by some construct-validation methods, such as the multitrait-multimethod matrix (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). The third facet involves these independent methods of data collection. One useful classification of such independent methods, for example, is proposed by Runkel and McGrath (1972), the main classes being subjective report, researcher observations, and past records. These independent methods of data collection are important in eventually showing that they can measure the construct and can obtain the "same" results.

Construct validity. Construct validity involves the extent to which interpretive claims that a test measures some criterion (or criteria) of axiological adequacy are sound, i.e., the extent to which plausible rival hypotheses are minimized. These plausible rival hypotheses are minimized by the gradual and systematic use of each of a variety of correlational, experimental, and logical methods to test some theoretical network (Cronbach, 1971). Although establishing

conceptual validity and content validity helps somewhat in minimizing the plausible rival hypotheses, the methods of construct validation are the final arbiter; without construct validation, claims about students' performance on criteria of axiological adequacy cannot be justified.

As a final indication of the complexity of the measurement task in construct validation, let me indicate briefly the main classes of plausible rival hypotheses. For this purpose, I distinguish values, values-related, and nonvalues phenomena and incorporate discussions of plausible rival hypotheses by Runkel and McGrath (1972) and Scott (1968). Plausible rival hypotheses involving other values phenomena may be proposed; i.e., some criterion of axiological adequacy other than that intended to be measured is actually being measured by a test. For example, a test may purport to measure strength but may actually measure intensity; a test may be intended to measure precedence but instead may actually measure importance. Plausible rival hypotheses involving values-related phenomena may be proposed; i.e., some satisfaction, attitude, interest, belief, or self-concept is actually being measured by a test rather than the criterion of axiological adequacy. For example, a test intended to measure respondents' views of the precedence of the church over other things may actually measure attitudes toward the church or beliefs about the church. Plausible rival hypotheses

involving nonvalues phenomena are of several kinds (plus interaction of any of the classes of hypotheses). Examples of rival hypotheses characterizing the respondent are social desirability, self-presentation modes, guinea-pig, response set, measurement as a change-agent, and role selection. Examples of rival hypotheses as to population are restrictions on the population, instability of the population over time, and instability of the population among geographical areas. Examples of instrument-specific rival hypotheses are verbosity, carelessness, acquiescence, and extremity. Examples of general-content rival hypotheses are content restrictions, content instability over time, and content instability over areas. Examples of situational rival hypotheses are characteristics of the test administrator, time of day, day of the week, noise, light, and physical aspects of group settings.

Conclusion

I have indicated some new directions for values education which are not suggested by Kirschenbaum. These new directions for goals, kinds of intervention, and research and development are implied by a perspective on axiological adequacy. Because these new directions are of fundamental importance for values education, their complexity requires a major effort in any serious attempt to improve values education.

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THE POWER OF POSITIVE PROGNOSTICATION IN VALUES EDUCATION: COMMENTS ON HOWARD KIRSCHENBAUM'S PAPER

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The author suggests that Kirschenbaum assesses the state of the art in values education with optimism clouded by uncritical eclecticism. It is an unwarranted assumption that all specialists would agree on his 2 ultimate goals, and there is little justification for his grouping of values-education approaches. Unfortunately, it has been the experience of facilitators and practitioners that personal commitments and numerous techniques are insufficient to penetrate the barriers of parents and educators resistant to humanizing the classroom. The monumental task is to create a positive attitude toward, a desire for, values education so that the environment can be truly changed in a positive manner. Both attitudinal and financial support is urgently needed for collaborative, longitudinal, and carefully monitored projects. It is recommended that an international network of projects in values education be established under the umbrella of a competent R&D agency. In this effort, redundancy should be avoided, and assessment of existing programs should be undertaken in order to validate the claims of moral/citizenship educators.

Admittedly, Kirschenbaum has been assigned an awesome task: "to outline the state of the art in values education and to make recommendations for further research, development, and dissemination activities in this area." My task is almost equally awesome: to critique Kirschenbaum's product. My methodology will be a descriptive analysis of each part of his paper. I enjoy his optimism about the broad field;

however, I suggest that while his positive thinking may attract the initiate or the nonspecialist, it may also, by the same token, constitute a devious manipulation of those insufficiently informed or inexperienced.

Who Wants Which Goals

The first problem I see is Kirschenbaum's eclectic style; he homogenizes all approaches under two "overriding goals": (a) "to help people become more fulfilled and satisfied with the quality of their lives," and (b) "to help them become more constructive members of the groups of which they are a part." This means that basically the two ultimate goals of all values educators are self-awareness and perspectivism (relationships to others). Because of the global nature of these goals and their flexibility for many interpretations of specific ramifications, it is hard to fault Kirschenbaum. However, the philosophers and religionists will have a difficult time justifying such generalizations. Are we really talking about anything specifically to do with morality, or with a moral act, or with a moral frame of reference? Is Kirschenbaum not assuming that all values educators prefer to deal with the entire range of values? The values clarifiers might, but that would not be true for the moral developmentalists and many religious educators. If the goals permit one to react with the charge of moral relativism, then

Kirschenbaum is way off when he claims: "I have never encountered a serious advocate of moral, citizenship, or values education who disagreed fundamentally with these two goals." He clarifies the goal of being socially constructive as helping "create the conditions which permit others the freedom to pursue lives that will be fulfilling and satisfying to them. Again, this smacks of a highly relativistic stance that would be unacceptable to many moral educators and certain social theorists.

The next step in Kirschenbaum's synthesis is to focus upon the commonality of the values approaches that attempt to achieve the two goals. It is true that if the educator talks about teaching valuing skills or a specific kind of pupil skills, there will be a better opportunity to reach other educators and the community. I have already done this in specifying learner outcomes for four major goals or objectives in a curricular development project in southern Ontario (Meyer, 1976).

Curricular Concerns

However, I have trouble with Kirschenbaum's five dimensions of thinking, feeling, choosing or decision making, communicating, and acting. There appears to be no acceptable reason for the separate categories of "thinking" and "choosing or decision making." Granted that they are interrelated;

but where is the evidence that they can be meaningfully incorporated into a curricular program? Yes, the educator wishes to apply valuing processes and reinforce learned skills, but there is far more than that to adequate curriculum development. How does one integrate these skills with the content or form? What is the theoretical base for such application? Is any one perception of how a person learns as good as another?

The educational practitioner delights in the availability and the use of techniques. The assumption is that whoever created a technique knows both its justification and where it is supposed to take learners. The various values approaches, for the most part, do have theoretical bases, but there is considerable controversy about the appropriateness of some of these foundations. I seriously question whether there has been sufficient reflection and congruence about them. Many of our assumptions concerning the nature and purpose of human beings have been neither stated nor explicated. There is a claim that values educators are "doing their thing" to promote a democratic ideal of the polis. But are we sufficiently agreed on personal and societal goals and ideals? Have we shared and probed the learners and their guardians? Are we respecting the autonomy of the learner, or are we perhaps closing minds?

I am not suggesting that values educators should stop all

activities until such substantive problems are resolved. But I am suggesting that we be rigorously honest about our assumptions, goals, and claims; honesty includes modesty and caution.

Environmental Influence

Kirschenbaum claims that the dimension of social growth through values education is a desirable goal. Yet he does not refer to any of the complexities of political and sociological theories that impinge upon such a goal and upon citizenship education. When discussing research, he argues that developmental work in the separate approaches should go forward, while previously he claimed that: '(a) all of the approaches have the same goals, and (b) we now have sufficient knowledge about values education to get on with implementation. These statements are incongruent. The state of the art does tell us that there is a good deal of commonality among the approaches or techniques. However, it also tells us that we must alter the environment--the climate created by administrators, practitioners, institutions, and parents --before we can reasonably expect the desirable learner outcomes. Evidence is mounting that an environment of justice in the school, school systems, and larger community may be more crucial to values or moral development than are all the techniques combined (Clark, 1976; Paolitto & Hersh, 1976). We have yet to isolate, correlate, and identify the

causality of the variables and social forces at work in order to give credence to our programming.

Promising Directions

I strongly agree with Kirschenbaum's recommendation that funding be made available to (a) carry out longitudinal studies (5 to 10 or more years) that will attempt to correlate the variables, and (b) structure an environment (school[s], school system[s]) that will promote development. I would add that such projects should draw upon those who have tackled these larger issues and who relate to practitioners as change-agents for professional and curricular development. These efforts should emanate from an international network incorporating the work of leaders in the United Kingdom and Canada. They should be monitored by a carefully selected agency or consortium, with a representative panel of specialists and funding agents. I would go so far as to say that, in the United States, Research for Better Schools would admirably perform a coordinating function.

Demonstration schools, teacher training, materials, and support groups are mentioned by Kirschenbaum as important for the dissemination phase. I find it difficult to separate those components if one is concerned about a holistic framework. My experience has been that a well-designed project should attempt to collaborate with the community and the

school in training teachers and administrators in the theories and application of techniques that would, in turn, lead to the development of materials and support activities. We need to discover and to apply better methods of change. We need to build upon the consent and cooperation of the establishment in a joint venture for the improvement of society. But first we need to clarify or prioritize our shared assumptions and goals. Call it "community awareness" or simply good planning.

The component that will most significantly assist the growth of values education is the development of evaluation procedures, both formative and summative. Although we have some experience in evaluation in this domain, a massive effort must be undertaken to bring credibility to such projects. This calls for concentrated efforts to secure funding for a major evaluation project designed to research, develop, and apply measurements to values/moral/citizenship education. The project must be long-range and consist of the combined and concerted talents of evaluators, statisticians, and curriculum developers. In times of restraint, fiscal and otherwise, the first question voiced by the community and educators is how to justify moral/citizenship education; we need visible evidence that it works.

Most of the needs that I have suggested could be managed by carefully planned centers of research and development

under some form of controlled network. Each of these centers might focus on a particular dimension, e.g., measurement, curricula for specific grade levels, community relations, and support material for curricula. The network control center would disseminate communications, advise and control funding, and integrate and coordinate the other centers' activities by rotating visitations, colloquia, publications, exchanges, seminars, and so forth.

There are some useful precedents in the centers at Cambridge University (U.K.), Florida State University, Harvard University, the National Humanistic Education Center, State University of New York at Cortland, Research for Better Schools, the University of British Columbia, and Windsor University.

The time is upon us to unite and become better managers and change-agents.

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